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Abstract
As a result of financial scandals, fraud has become an impor-
tant concern over the past decades, which has also raised the 
issue of independent auditors’ responsibilities for detecting 
fraud. This study examines how auditors perform fraud risk 
assessment by applying either the traditional or the decom-
position methods to different perceived risk level settings. We 
also investigate how the outcomes of risk assessment influence 
the audit planning phase.
The results prove that the decomposition approach more 
significantly enhances auditors’ sensitivity to fraud cues 
between a high and low fraud risk condition than using the 
traditional audit risk model. In addition, the perception of a 
more enhanced fraud risk leads to higher propensity to consult 
with forensic experts. Finally, the research also indicates that 
the assessed fraud risk level has fundamental impact on total 
hours budgeted for the audit engagement along with internal 
structure of total hours allocated to the audit.
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1 Introduction
The renowned accounting malfeasances of the past decades 
have raised the question to what extent users of financial infor-
mation can be convinced that those truly and fairly represent 
the financial position and performance of a company. The scan-
dals of Enron, WorldCom, and AIG are examples how fraud 
itself can deteriorate the trust in financial statements disclosed. 
In addition, as a secondary impact, some aspects of auditing 
had to be reconsidered all over the world. Fraud has been an 
important concern even in Hungary, provoked by recent col-
lapses of some brokerage firms (Buda-Cash Zrt., Questor Zrt.), 
which has a serious social and economic effect on other sectors 
as well. Examining the patterns of such financial scandals, one 
can conclude that all directed the attention to the accountability 
of independent auditors in terms of material misstatements due 
to fraud; are they responsible for and capable of detecting fraud 
in all circumstances? How does the suspicion of fraud affect 
the nature of audit procedures to be performed?
From auditors’ point of view, the rational approach to 
answer the aforementioned questions requires the profound 
understanding what professional auditing standards comprise 
regarding the terms and signals of fraud, and also the responses 
to the assessed risks of material misstatement due to fraud. 
Regardless the place in the world where an independent audi-
tor performs audit services, one shall conform to generally 
accepted professional standards while conducting or partici-
pating in audit engagements. In the context of this research, 
two auditing frameworks are of crucial importance: on the one 
hand, the International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) released 
by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB) and, on the other hand, the so-called Statements on 
Auditing Standards (SASs) issued by the Auditing Standards 
Board (ASB) of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA). The rationale behind this is twofold: 
our research concept is based on a study carried out in the U.S. 
where auditors shall comply with the standards issued by the 
ASB, while ISAs are mandatory for statutory audits in Europe 
proclaimed by the Directive 2014/56/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending 
1 Department of Finance, Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences, 
Budapest University of Technology and Economics 
H-1117 Budapest, Magyar tudósok körútja 2., Hungary
2 Department of Finance and Accounting, International Business School, 
H-1031 Budapest, Záhony utca 7., Hungary
* Corresponding author, e-mail: szivos@finance.bme.hu
24(2), pp. 102-112, 2016
DOI: 10.3311/PPso.8436
Creative Commons Attribution b
research article
P Periodica Polytechnica
Social and Management 
Sciences
103Different Approaches to Fraud Risk Assessment and ... 2016 24 2
Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts 
and consolidated accounts.
In 2007, the ASB launched a clarity project in order to 
form standards that are easier to comprehend and apply, with 
remarkable efforts to converge its standards with ISAs. As 
a result, clarified SASs are different from the parallel ISAs 
only to a smaller extent where persuasive explanations exist 
(AICPA, 2014). The applicable fraud-related standards were 
deeply investigated in order to reveal if any differences had 
implications on our research process. We conclude that minor 
dissimilarities we found between ISAs and SASs (hereinafter 
Standards) do not impose limitations on our findings. 
As laid down in the Standards, the suspect of fraud shall be 
taken into consideration in the whole process of auditing (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1 Consideration of fraud in the audit process
This study focuses on the second step: the planning of audit. 
Out of the planning tasks, the risk assessment in terms of fraud, 
and its implication on the audit procedures are investigated 
by applying and contrasting two different approaches. Our 
research examines how different approaches of risk assessment 
(traditional vs. decomposition methods) influence the per-
ceived level of fraud risk under different risk scenarios. 
In the planning stage of an audit engagement auditors are 
expected to assess the components of the audit risk (i.e. inher-
ent risk, control risk, and detection risk) with the traditional 
audit risk model required by the prevailing standards and then 
evaluate fraud risk separately. The audit risk formula given:
AR= IR*CR* DR,
where:
AR = Audit Risk
IR = Inherent Risk
CR = Control Risk
DR = Detection Risk.
In the decomposition fraud risk assessment method, 
besides the traditional audit risk assessment model, the fraud 
risk is broken down into sub elements of the fraud triangle; 
the risk of incentives or pressure, the risk of rationalization 
or attitude, and finally the risk of opportunities to commit 
fraud (Wilks and Zimbelman, 2004; Favere-Marchesi, 2013). 
Srivastava et al. (2009) proposed a further consideration in 
addition to the three previously mentioned components of the 
fraud triangle. The authors recommended to incorporate a forth 
risk factor, the risk that fraud specific procedures performed 
by auditors will fail to detect fraud, into the model. These four 
components together will draw the attention of auditors not 
only to fraud cues, the risks arising along the elements of the 
fraud triangle, but also to the risk that audit plan might con-
tain ineffective fraud detecting procedures. The function of the 
aforementioned four factors represents the overall fraud risk:
FR= RI * RA* RO* RSP,
where:
FR = Fraud Risk
RI = Risk of Incentives
RA = Risk of Attitude
RO = Risk of Opportunities
RSP = Risk that Special Procedures fail to detect 
fraud.
In addition to the examination of the impacts of the aforemen-
tioned two approaches on risk assessment, it is also explored 
how the fraud risk assessment affects the auditing procedures to 
be implemented by the auditor. From a research standpoint, it is 
essential to overview to what extent and how Standards support 
auditors’ work as far as it is relevant to our research.
The Standards describe characteristics of fraud as misstate-
ments in financial statements generated by an intentional action, 
involving either misappropriation of assets or fraudulent finan-
cial reporting (ISA 240 on ‘The auditor’s responsibilities relating 
to fraud in an audit of financial statements’). Fraud itself contains 
three elements; 1) incentive (or pressure) to achieve a target, 2) 
opportunity to commit a fraud, and 3) rationalization (or atti-
tude) to do so, together widely-known as ‘fraud triangle’ in the 
academic literature (Cressey, 1973). The perception and assess-
ment of the three elements is a key dimension of the research as 
fraud risk related researches define fraud as the function of these 
three determining factors influencing the behavior of a potential 
fraudster. Incentive is the perceived motivation or pressure on 
individual to commit fraud. Such incentive can be the pressure 
to achieve analysts’ forecasts in the case of a listed company, or 
the motivation to pursue accounting profit which comes from 
large profit related bonus compensations. The opportunity arises 
when certain conditions facilitating the perpetration of fraud are 
in place. The lack or weaknesses of proper internal control might 
allow the misappropriation of assets. Inappropriate board struc-
ture or weak oversight might also facilitate the manipulation of 
accounting records in order to report higher earnings. Through 
the attitude, a person can rationalize the act itself. Each of the 
aforementioned factors are necessary but not sufficient condi-
tions for committing fraud, so fraud risk assessment should con-
sider the interaction of these factors (Loebbecke et al., 1989).
(1)
(2)
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With regards to the responsibility of the auditor, reasonable 
assurance shall be obtained that the financial statements are free 
from material misstatements, whether caused by fraud or error. 
Consequently, professional skepticism should be maintained to 
suspect or to identify the occurrence of fraud, and the necessity 
of continuous consideration of fraud is beyond dispute.
Based on the auditor’s risk assessment, appropriate responses 
to the assessed risks of material misstatement caused by fraud 
shall be determined. The procedures shall reflect the fact that 
the auditor perceives higher risk of fraud. The Standards pro-
vide broad guidance in terms of fraud risk factors based on the 
elements of the fraud triangle, possible procedures to address 
the fraud risk, and depict circumstances that tend to indicate 
the occurrence of fraud. The expertise of professional Stand-
ards, reinforced by extensive audit experience and appropriate 
training, all fundamentally contribute to the ability of perform-
ing audit engagements of high quality in general, and from the 
aspect of fraud particularly.
2 Literature review
Zimbelman (1997) tested 108 auditors with a computer 
based case study and found that those auditors who were asked 
to assess fraud risk separately (intentional and unintentional 
misstatements) spent more time with reading red-flag cues 
compared to those who used the holistic method1. The research 
supported the hypothesis that the time taken to collect the nec-
essary information from the case was mainly determined by the 
pursued risk assessment methodology. It was also evidenced 
that auditors using the decomposition method of risk assess-
ment were more sensitive to fraud risk and, as a response, 
increased number of hours were budgeted for the higher fraud 
risk case. The study also addressed how auditors respond if 
higher fraud risk is perceived. The author found that there were 
no qualitative differences in responses, for which three possi-
ble reasons can be brought. Either (1) auditors do not have the 
professional and technical knowledge how to adjust audit plan 
with fraud specific procedures, or (2) auditors generally think 
it is not effective to adjust the audit plan, or (3) they do not 
believe that this adjustments is necessary.
Knapp and Knapp (2001) in their study examined the impact 
of professional experience on the ability of auditors to apply 
analytical procedures to detect fraud. The authors’ research 
proved that more extensive experience will positively affect 
auditors’ performance in detecting fraud. Audit managers were 
significantly more effective in assessing the risk of financial 
statement fraud with analytical procedures than were audit sen-
iors. The authors also found that if auditors are provided with 
explicit fraud risk assessment instructions they assess the risk 
of fraud consistently and significantly higher for the fraud case 
than without these instructions. In the lack of explicit fraud risk 
assessment, however, auditors did not assess significantly dif-
ferent fraud risk for the fraud case than for the non-fraud case. 
The study concluded that the combination of higher profes-
sional experience and explicit fraud risk assessment instruc-
tions brought more effective fraud risk assessment.
The effectiveness of using checklists in the risk assessment 
process and fraud detection responses was tested by Asare and 
Wright (2004). Standard risk checklists are frequently used 
in practice where risk factors are usually broken down into 
three categories recommended by AICPA (AU-C Sec. 240 on 
‘Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit’). The 
experiment conducted supported their hypothesis that auditors 
in a no-checklist condition assess higher fraud risk than in a 
standard checklist condition. It was also revealed by the experi-
ment that higher fraud risk assessment was not associated with 
more effective audit program plan, which means that audit pro-
gram plans were not adjusted appropriately to reflect the meas-
ured fraud risk. Auditors without a standard audit program pre-
pared a more effective set of fraud related tests and were more 
likely to consult with a fraud expert than those with a standard 
program. Authors also found that there is a positive association 
between fraud risk assessment and the auditors’ intention to 
consult with fraud professionals.
A quite early research (Shelton, 2001) found that auditors 
may focus too much on the attitude component of the fraud tri-
angle while tend to neglect the two others. As it was presented 
previously, the risk of fraud cannot be exclusively explained by 
the attitude of management, but it is a function of attitude, oppor-
tunity, and incentive. Several common sense explanations can be 
brought up to support this previous idea. On the one hand, the 
decomposition of fraud risk might reveal information which may 
be overlooked in the holistic case. On the other hand, the decom-
position approach requires less cognitive effort than the holistic 
decision. Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) examined how the fraud-
triangle decomposition affects overall fraud risk assessment. 
Instead of using long standardized fraud checklists, they recom-
mended to split the risk assessment along the components of the 
fraud-triangle. They hypothesized that with focusing on seem-
ingly unrelated list of fraud cues, auditors might lose sight of the 
overall fraud risk. Using the decomposition method in line with 
the fraud-triangle auditors not only free up resources of cogni-
tive effort but auditors, before setting overall fraud risk level, 
are also enforced to focus better on the three components of the 
fraud risk. In their experiment they found that auditors’ com-
ponent assessments of opportunity and incentive risks are more 
sensitive to variations in those risks when they anticipate making 
these component assessments via a fraud triangle decomposition.
Hammersley et al. (2011) reported about an experiment test-
ing how audit seniors respond to heightened fraud risk when 
1 The term of “holistic method” was later replaced by “traditional approach” 
to risk assessment by several academics. Within the framework of this study, 
we use also the expression of ’traditional’. Details of both the traditional and 
the decomposition approaches are elaborated in the Introduction section.
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constructing their audit plan. In the case study provided to the 
auditors, the authors manipulated the risk level by describ-
ing material weakness conditions in controls. The research 
proved that auditors assess higher fraud risk when material 
weakness information is present, but fail to produce a better 
quality audit plan. In contrast, the constructed audit plan was 
less efficient and of lower quality. Based on the study audi-
tors, after assessing higher fraud risk, involved less efficient 
procedures by typically increasing the sample size instead of 
changing the nature of the audit program and/or involving more 
fraud specific procedures. The authors did not investigate train-
ing related questions, however they emphasized the need to 
reconsider and improve the auditors’ professional trainings to 
assist them in fraud detection. They also identified two limi-
tations of their study. First, auditors usually work in a team, 
so researches focusing on individual risk assessment and audit 
planning might not be representative. Secondly, the study failed 
to address the question why audit seniors draw up a lower qual-
ity audit plan if they assess higher fraud risk. Future research 
direction, to investigate the explanatory factors of the less effi-
cient audit plan, was recommended by the authors.
Carpenter (2007) conducted an experiment to investigate 
the efficiency of team brainstorming in assessing fraud risk. 40 
audit teams with three members each, representing all of the 
BIG 4 firms, participated in the study. She concluded that brain-
storming sessions resulted in an overall loss of the individuals’ 
ideas generated before the brainstorming session. However, it 
was also evidenced that the overall quality of the fraud ideas 
was improved after the session. As for the fraud risk, the results 
suggested that when fraud cues are present the audit team’s 
fraud risk assessment after the brainstorming sessions is signifi-
cantly higher than the assessed risk level of individual auditor’s.
Seow (2009) tested the impact of technical knowledge and 
decision aid use on fraud risk assessment. It was found that 
decision aid use had a negative effect on high-knowledge par-
ticipants while resulted in an improved performance in the case 
of low-knowledge students. The experiment was conducted in 
two groups where in one of the group’s case text diagnostic and 
non-diagnostic fraud cues, taken from ISA 240, were disclosed. 
Other researches (Fukukawa et al., 2011; Favere-Marchesi, 
2013) deal with the impact of fraud risk categorization on the 
risk assessment and audit planning decisions. Fukukawa et al. 
(2011) revealed that the auditors’ grouping of individual client 
risks is basically in line with the categories provided by the pre-
vailing auditing standards. Based on their findings, and on the 
fact that there is less or little guideline in the standards address-
ing the grouping of individual client risks, the authors urged the 
need to give training guidelines how auditors should draw up 
the groups. They also identified that the way to improve audit 
planning efficiency and effectiveness lays in the more efficient 
grouping of individual risks. However, Favere-Marchesi (2013) 
proved with their experiment involving 60 audit managers that 
auditors decomposing fraud risk assess a significantly different 
fraud risk than those who simply categorize fraud cues. The 
author also found that auditors decomposing fraud risk felt a 
higher need to modify audit plan and to enhance the extent of 
audit testing.
Several studies (e.g. Srivastava et al., 2011; Fukukawa and 
Mock, 2011) approach the fraud risk assessment from decision 
theory point of view. Fukukawa and Mock (2011) tested if asser-
tion framing affects risk assessments and whether the effects 
hinge on risk assessment approach. In the experiment, assertion 
framing was manipulated by stating financial statement assertions 
in both positive and negative forms. The test indicated that when 
the belief-based assessments were transformed into probabilities, 
the difference was not significant. The authors could evidence 
significant assertion framing effects. As a final conclusion it can 
be stated that both the chosen risk measures and the way asser-
tions are framed are proved to be important audit decisions and 
both have a large impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of an 
audit. The introduction of the Dempster-Shafter evidential rea-
soning theory (Srivastava et al., 2011) could be used with success 
in fraud risk assessment as the method can manage uncertainties 
related to audit risk, information security and information quality 
assessment. Authors also argue that instead of using a single audit 
risk model it is advised that auditors should assess separately the 
risk of errors, irregularities and management fraud.
A number of researchers (Loebbecke et al., 1989; Gold et al., 
2010; Hoffman and Zimbelman, 2009; Asare and Wright, 2004; 
Hammersley et al., 2011; Hammersley, 2011) examined how 
frequently auditors meet with fraudulent financial statements, 
and all found that fraud is relatively rare. This raises the question 
how auditors gain most of their knowledge and ability to detect 
fraud and give the required responses. Hammersley (2011) 
stated that fraud related knowledge is gained mostly through 
training and not through experience, and this knowledge can 
be increased by higher problem solving ability and epistemic 
motivation. The aforementioned three factors (i.e. knowledge, 
problem solving ability and epistemic motivation) infiltrate into 
the process of audit planning, and explain how auditors modify 
their plans as a response to the assessed fraud risk.
3 Research questions
Taking into consideration the fundamental differences 
between two approaches (traditional vs. decomposition) elabo-
rated previously, the decomposition fraud risk model is expected 
to result in a more precise risk assessment where auditors tend 
to be more sensitive, and their attention is notably directed to 
the successful identification and consideration of fraud cues. 
By using the decomposition approach, auditors might better 
identify the incentives/pressures management members might 
face to commit fraud. The decomposition model may also sup-
port auditors in revealing the weaknesses of internal control 
systems with higher success, and in more efficiently identifying 
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the attitude through which perpetrators may rationalize their 
fraudulent acts. We set up a hypothesis in order to support these 
aforementioned ideas cited:
H1: With the assistance of the decomposition fraud 
risk assessment model, auditors’ sensitivity to fraud cues 
between a high and low fraud risk condition is significantly 
greater than using the traditional audit risk model.
By assessing the fraud risk, auditors express their opinion, 
being partially objective or partially subjective, on the prob-
ability that financial statements are misstated due to fraud. Both 
fraud red flags, embedded in a scenario, and also individual 
sentiments are expressed in the level of the fraud risk assessed 
by a professional. We believe that all the consecutive actions 
made by the auditor, will be based on the outcome of this risk 
assessment, so most of our further hypotheses will examine 
how the responses given in the audit plan (audit procedures 
and time budget) correspond to the level of fraud risk assessed. 
However, in certain cases, mainly to conform to previous aca-
demic researches, we also examine the impact of the initial 
condition (applied risk assessment method, high or low risk 
scenario) on the audit planning decisions. 
Nowadays a great variety of forensic services has been 
offered by consulting companies. The success in detecting 
fraud lies in a mixture of broad skills and knowledge (inter-
nal control, information technology, digital evidence recovery, 
auditing, psychology etc.), which are not always in the posses-
sion of auditors. Some researches (e.g. Asare and Wright, 2004) 
concluded that auditors are reluctant to consult with external 
fraud experts, while other studies evidenced that the propensity 
to consult with experts increases as the level of assessed fraud 
risk is getting higher. All of this gave us our next hypothesis:
H2: The higher the assessed fraud risk is, the higher the 
auditors’ propensity is to consult with external forensic experts.
Based on ISA 330, auditors shall determine overall 
responses to address the risks of material misstatement. Under 
circumstances where risk of material misstatement due to fraud 
is identified, the auditors’ responses shall address the identi-
fied risks, and may include amendments into the nature, the 
extent and timing of audit procedures to be performed. Fraud 
effective tests are procedures, other than regularly conducted 
audit procedures, which specifically address the detection of 
material misstatement due to fraud. Several international stud-
ies evidenced (Zimbelman, 1997; Asare and Wright, 2004) that 
auditors are not successful in adjusting their audit programs to 
respond properly to the assessed level of fraud risk. The reason 
auditors fail to prepare a more effective audit program can be 
twofold. Either auditors do not have the knowledge of fraud 
specific procedures, or they simply do not feel the necessity 
to plan these procedures into the program. One might expect, 
as recommended by Srivastava et al. (2009), that by incorpo-
rating RSP into the fraud risk assessment model, the impor-
tance of proper fraud specific responses is more emphasized 
and highlighted, and the awareness of auditors is directed. 
However, we assume that by simply embedding RSP into the 
fraud risk assessment, auditors’ attention will not significantly 
turn to fraud specific tests as they, either due to lack of proper 
training or experience, do not have the required knowledge.
H3: If auditors’ assessed fraud risk is higher, they will 
not significantly modify the preliminary audit plan by 
including fraud effective tests compared to that condition 
when they assess lower fraud risk.
In a high risk condition where the assessed fraud risk is 
expected to be greater, auditors might assign more audit hours 
to perform the fraud effective tests and to extend procedures 
than previously budgeted. If auditors prepare a more effective 
audit plan including fraud related tests and procedures, then 
they will increase the budgeted hours of more experienced 
staff, so typically managers and partner hours will be enhanced. 
Our hypotheses:
H4: When auditors assess a higher fraud risk level, the 
total budgeted hours for the engagement will be signifi-
cantly higher compared to the case when auditors assess a 
lower fraud risk level.
H5: When auditors assess a higher fraud risk level, the 
percentage of hours they assign to more experienced audit 
staff will be significantly higher than in a lower assessed 
fraud risk condition.
4 Methodology
The hypotheses are tested with four versions of a realistic 
case study2 (2 x 2 experiment) which vary in terms of the fraud 
risk assessment approach required (traditional vs. decomposi-
tion) and fraud risk setting (low risk vs. high risk). Participants 
received one type out of the four case versions. In the traditional 
method, auditors were expected to assess the components of 
the audit risk (i.e. inherent risk, control risk, and detection risk) 
with the traditional audit risk model required by the prevail-
ing standards, and then to evaluate fraud risk separately. In the 
decomposition method besides the traditional audit risk assess-
ment model participants were required to break down the fraud 
risk into sub elements of the fraud triangle; the risk of incentives 
or pressure, the risk of rationalization or attitude, and finally risk 
of opportunities to commit fraud. On the online questionnaire 
platform the RSP (Risk of special procedures) was automati-
cally calculated with the assumption that the acceptable level 
of FR (Fraud Risk) is 0.05. A lower than 1.00 RSP indicated to 
auditors that they need to apply special forensic (fraud specific) 
procedures in order to keep FR at the desired 0.05 level.
2 This research is based on the case study (Precision Equipment Inc.) 
originally developed by Asare and Wright (2004) and used by several further 
fraud related studies (e.g. Hammersley et al., 2011; Mock et al., 2011 etc.). In 
the original case only minor adjustment and modifications were made in order 
to adopt it to the Hungarian conditions.
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Information provided to auditors differed to some extent 
whether low risk or high risk cases were delivered. In the low risk 
setting, management is compensated by a base salary and there 
do not exist extraordinary earnings targets to be achieved and 
also less details of the suspicious sales transaction are shared. 
In the high risk setting, management can get significant bonuses 
and share options if challenging targets are accomplished. In 
addition, a newly launched marketing campaign might have 
resulted in misstating revenues once distributors fail to increase 
sales despite the enhanced marketing efforts. Recognizing red 
flags (fraud cues) in the high risk setting was a key factor in the 
research as it directly relates to addressing the hypotheses.
As described in the introduction to the case study, partici-
pants were asked to finalize the audit programme for the revenue 
cycle of the designated client. Background information and key 
financial highlights (i.e. balance sheet, income statements, and 
key financial ratios) were provided, and a short industry analy-
sis along with the firm’s marketing strategy were also available. 
Based on previous years’ audit experience, participants had 
information on the control environment and the revenue cycle. 
In the first part of the case assignment, auditors were 
requested to complete the risk assessment by applying either the 
traditional or the decomposition approach.
As a second step, participants had to confirm/adjust the audit 
program for the revenue cycle. A preliminary substantive audit 
programme was offered, and participants had the opportunity to 
alter the programme in any way, even by deleting or adding new 
procedures or changing the extent of audit procedures, while 
keeping in mind the efficiency and the assessed level of risk. 
In the third section, auditors were expected to update total 
budgeted hours (total 65 hours) by staff level (staff/senior/man-
ager/partner hours) in order to reflect the proposed amendments 
in the audit procedures that address the perceived level of risk. 
On the other hand, participants were asked to express their opin-
ion on the necessity of consulting a forensic expert to complete 
the audit plan on a 10 point Likert scale (1= needless to consult, 
5= moderate need to consult, 10= high need to consult).
In the final part, auditors responded to some fundamental 
demographic questions. The main issues encompassed auditing 
experience (BIG 4 or non-BIG 4, years of experience), posi-
tion taken, educational background, membership in professional 
bodies, and prior knowledge of fraud triangle.
5 Manipulation check
In the survey, it was tested by a distinct question if the risk 
manipulation was successful or not. Respondents were asked 
to “Assess the level of fraud risk for the revenue cycle” on a 
7 point Likert scale, where 1 = low risk and 7 = high risk. As 
it can be seen in Table 3 (Appendix), from the aspect of the 
overall fraud risk question, the manipulation was successful (p 
= 0.0186) which means that the auditors encoded the two dif-
ferent risk settings as it was intended.
6 Participants
The participants voluntarily completed the case study 
online. They were instructed not to discuss their answers with 
colleagues, as individual judgement was of crucial importance. 
The Chamber of Hungarian Auditors assisted the research with 
informing its members about the online survey. Altogether 61 
responses were collected electronically, out of which six were 
removed from the sample before further analysis due to either 
the incompleteness or inconsistency of answers, or even failure 
in the manipulation check.
Demographic information on the sample is detailed in 
Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 demonstrates that 65 % of participants 
(20 seniors, 15 partners, 1 executive director of audit firm) indi-
cated high profile positions in which risk assessment and audit 
planning are core activities of their job. The risk assessment 
and the audit planning, tested by this study, are also performed 
by those auditors who do not work for audit firms as employees 
but run their own audit business individually (13 %, 7 persons). 
Subsequently, 78 % of participants have profound experience 
in performing the tasks investigated through this research. As 
indication of successful randomization of the sample, statistical 
tests did not show significant differences in the demographic 
variables between the distinct survey conditions (low risk vs. 
high risk, decomposition vs. traditional).
Table 1 Current Position and Professional Background of the respondents (N)
Manager 11 (20 %)
Senior 20 (36 %)
Partner 15 (27)
Other1 9 (16 %)
Total 55 (100 %)
ACCA student 4 (7 %)
ACCA member 7 (13 %)
MKVK2 student or mentoring phase 5 (9 %)
MKVK active member 42 (76 %)
MKVK inactive member 2 (36 %)
Table 2 Other characteristics of the sample
Mean (SD) Min Max
Total audit experience (months) 185.7 (80.9) 37 363
Experience with revenue 
recognition (1-7)
5.96 (1.43) 2 7
Note: Experience with revenue recognition: 1 = no prior experience,
7 = dealt with it very often
Participants had an average of 186 months of professional 
experience, with a standard deviation of 81 months. The indi-
cated prior experience with the revenue cycle audit (mean 5.96 
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on a 7 point Likert scale) also supports the idea that partici-
pants had the necessary skills and experience for answering 
the case assignment.
The IT background ensured randomly that the sample is 
consistent in terms of the four versions; 29 participants by the 
traditional approach (15 low risk, 14 high risk), 26 auditors by 
the decomposition approach (13 for both low and high risk).
7 Results
Performing the ANOVA (Table 4 in Appendix) analysis to 
understand the impact of the case version (high vs.. low risk 
scenario) and the applied risk assessment method (traditional 
vs. decomposition) on the level of fraud risk, we found that 
there is a significant main effect for risk version (p=0.006217) 
and for the interaction between risk version and risk assess-
ment approach (p=0.00321). Single significant main effect 
could not be identified for the chosen risk assessment method 
(p=0.069598), however, it is demonstrated in Fig. 2 (and Table 
5 in Appendix) that with the application of the decomposi-
tion risk assessment method auditors could better differentiate 
between the high (mean: 0.488) and low (mean: 0.115) risk sce-
narios than applying the traditional one. We can conclude that 
the decomposition method of fraud risk assessment drew the 
attention of auditors to fraud cues more successfully than the 
traditional approach, thus enhanced the sensitivity to fraud risk. 
While in case of participants using the traditional approach, the 
lack of sensitivity to fraud risk can be identified. With all of 
previous H1 can be supported and justified.
Fig. 2 Assessed Fraud Risk
Regarding the propensity of auditors to consult with exter-
nal forensic experts, first the relationship between the level 
of fraud risk they assessed and the strength they felt (10 point 
Likert scale) the need to consult was tested. Figure 3 shows that 
a medium strong relationship (r = 0.6059, r2 = 0.3671) can be 
identified between the fraud risk auditors assessed and the need 
they felt to consult with external forensic experts, supporting H2. 
This means that the higher the fraud risk assessed by the audi-
tors is, the higher need they feel to consult with an expert. As it 
was previously evidenced, the level of fraud risk is determined 
primarily by the risk version and the interaction between the risk 
version and the applied risk assessment method. We can assume 
that these two factors also have a significant main effect on audi-
tors’ intention to consult with experts. The ANOVA analysis in 
Table 6 in Appendix (and Fig. 4) shows that separately neither the 
risk version (p = 0.056512) nor the applied method (traditional 
vs. decomposition) (p = 0.836907) has significant main effect on 
the auditor’s propensity to consult with fraud experts, however 
their interaction is significant (p = 0.000750). This means that 
by applying the decomposition fraud risk assessment method, 
auditors can more effectively differentiate between the high and 
the low fraud risk setting, and as a consequence, they can better 
adjust their consideration whether to consult with external fraud 
expert. The highest need to consult with external forensic experts 
(mean 5.77, SD 2.28) was revealed in the high risk setting with 
the decomposition approach.
Fig. 3 The relationship between the Assessed Fraud Risk 
and Need to Consult with external fraud expert
Fig. 4 Need to consult with external fraud expert
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In order to test the auditors’ responses to a higher assessed 
fraud risk level from the standpoint of the audit procedures, the 
modified audit plan responses received from participants were 
split into two categories. Responses with an assessed fraud risk 
below 0.28 were grouped together into Category “low”, while 
the responses above 0.28 fraud risk level were clustered to 
Category “high”. As standard distribution for the assessed fraud 
risk cases could not be observed from the sample, the separa-
tion between low and high fraud risk responses was performed 
on the basis of Fig. 5, which shows a well-identifiable gap in 
the responses at 0.28 assessed level of fraud risk. Examining 
the audit planning decisions (Table 8 in Appendix) one can find 
that auditors primarily chose either to perform the standard pro-
cedure or they increase sample size. Performing the Chi-Square 
test for the two most commonly indicated answers we can see 
that the fraud risk level has significant impact on neither of the 
most frequently given answers (“Perform standard procedure”: 
Chi-Sq = 8.251, DF = 12, P-Value = 0.765; “Increase sample 
size”: Chi-Sq = 9.951, DF = 12, P-Value = 0.62).
Fig. 5 Observed fraud risk level
For testing H4 and H5, first a Sign test for median was per-
formed (Table 9 in Appendix) which indicates that auditors 
prepared a significantly different time budget compared to 
the preliminary time budget given. The Mann-Whitney U test 
(Table 10 in Appendix) performed indicates that the fraud risk 
category (“high” and “low”) has a significant main effect both 
on the total hours budgeted (p = 0.015633) and on the manager 
hours budgeted (p = 0.003273). We can conclude that auditors 
not only give a significantly different total hours staffing com-
pared to the preliminary budget but also they increase manager 
hours most typically, thus H4 and H5 are supported. However, 
consolidating the results of the time budget and the audit plan 
examinations it turns out that auditors, as a response to higher 
assessed fraud risk, routinely increase sample size or perform 
standard procedure for which they typically budget higher 
manager hours. Using more experienced staff for doing more 
from the same procedures is not effective, and could make an 
audit engagement excessively expensive.
8 Conclusion
Our study examined two crucial steps of the audit process; 
the fraud risk assessment and the audit program planning tasks. 
Fraud, its detection and prevention have not just been excit-
ing current issues, but also their academic investigation has an 
extended background. The contribution of this research to the 
academic literature and to the auditing profession itself is two-
fold. First, our fundamental objective was to conduct a test in 
Hungary which delivers answers to a commonly tackled ques-
tions in the international literature. Secondly, by contrasting 
our results to previous researches, we intended to give a hand to 
the development of external audit profession at national level. 
One of our major findings is that the application of the decom-
position fraud risk assessment method enhanced the sensitivity 
of auditors to fraud cues, and as a consequence, they could better 
differentiate between a high and low fraud risk scenario, while 
by using the traditional approach they failed to make a significant 
distinction. The results suggest that the higher the assessed fraud 
risk is, the more likely auditors will feel the need to consult with 
external forensic experts is. Examining audit planning decisions 
the study revealed that decomposition fraud risk assessment 
improved the ability to identify high risk engagements, however, 
does not result in an audit plan of higher quality. Auditors gener-
ally either perform the standard procedure or increase sample 
sizes, but do not imply remarkable fraud effective tests. From 
the aspect of the time budget setting, higher assessed fraud risk 
usually results in higher total budgeted hours, and most typically 
auditors increase the budgeted hours for more experienced staff 
(managers). This might result in an ineffective audit program, 
where auditors use managers’ capacity to cope with increased 
sample sizes. The failure in giving proper responses to higher 
fraud risk might arise from two sources. By incorporating the 
risk of special procedures into the fraud risk assessment model 
and evaluating the results, we can conclude that the shortage of 
knowledge is a more significant factor than the lack of the audi-
tors’ attention towards the necessity of these procedures. As the 
occurrence of fraud is quite rare in real life, the most effective 
way of improving the auditors’ knowledge can be overcome by 
trainings and professional education.
The results could also have a primary impact on our profes-
sional practice, as the obvious advantages of the decomposition 
method might result in its widespread practical implementation. 
The fact that auditors proved to be unable to give proper responses 
to a higher assessed fraud risk, might urge the need to make the 
necessary modifications in the field of professional trainings as 
well. In order to support the latter idea, further research directions 
should investigate the relationship between different demograph-
ical aspects of participants, such us previous professional experi-
ence and training, and the quality of the audit plan responses give.
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Appendix
Table 3 Manipulation check
Variables
T-test; Grouping: Risk version






















4.37 3.36 2.429 53 0.0186 27 28 1.6443 1.4457 1.2937 0.5102
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Table 4 Assessed Fraud Risk - ANOVA results
Univariate Tests of Significance for Fraud Risk
Sigma-restricted parameterization
Effective hypothesis decomposition
Effect SS Degr. of Freedom Mean Square F p
Intercept 6.090096 1 6.090096 141.5304 0.000000
Method 0.147830 1 0.147830 3.4355 0.069598
Risk version 0.350617 1 0.350617 8.1481 0.006217
Method*Risk version 0.411953 1 0.411953 9.5735 0.003201
Error 2.194546 51 0.043030
Note: Method = traditional fraud risk assessment vs. decomposition fraud risk assessment; Risk version= low vs. high risk scenario
Table 5 Descriptive statistics - Assessed fraud risk (Mean (SD) [N])
Method Low Risk Scenario High Risk Scenario Total
Traditional 0.392 (0.271) [15] 0.379 (0.148) [14] 0.386 (0.217) [29]
Decomposition 0.115 (0.192) [13] 0.488 (0.190) [13] 0.281 (0.253) [26]
Total 0.263 (0.273) [28] 0.412 (0.167) [27] 0.336 (0.238) [55]
Note: Dependent variable – fraud risk assessment 0.00 – 1.00 (probability of fraud,
where 0 = no chance of occurrence and 1.00 = 100 % chance of occurrence)
Table 6 Need to consult with external fraud expert - ANOVA results
Univariate Tests of Significance for Need to consult with external fraud expert (1—10)
Sigma-restricted parameterization
Effective hypothesis decomposition
Effect SS Degr. of Freedom Mean Square F p
Intercept 972.8497 1 972.8497 241.9404 0.000000
Risk version 15.3120 1 15.3120 3.8080 0.056512
Method 0.1721 1 0.1721 0.0428 0.836907
Risk version*Method 51.7185 1 51.7185 12.8620 0.000750
Error 205.0725 51 4.0210
Note: Method = traditional fraud risk assessment vs. decomposition fraud risk assessment; Risk version = low vs. high risk scenario
Table 7 Descriptive statistics - Need to consult with external fraud expert (1 - 10) (Mean (SD) [N])
Method Low Risk Scenario High Risk Scenario Total
Traditional 4,600 (1.957) [15] 3.714 (1.939) [14] 4.172 (1.965) [29]
Decomposition 2.769 (1,833) [13] 5,769 (2,279) [13] 4.269 (2.539) [26]
Total 3.750 (2.084) [28] 4.704 (2.317) [27] 4.218 (2.234) [55]
Note: Dependent variable – Need to consult with external fraud expert 1 – 10
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Table 8 Descriptive statistics – Distribution of auditors’ answers regarding their audit planning decision
 
Omit procedure / not 
meaningful
Perform standard procedure Increase sample size
Other modifications in the 
audit program
 „low” risk „high” risk „low” risk „high” risk „low” risk „high” risk „low” risk „high” risk
AP1 4.35 0.00 73.91 71.88 21.74 15.63 0.00 12.50
AP2 0.00 0.00 60.87 46.88 34.78 46.88 4.35 6.25
AP3 4.35 0.00 39.13 34.38 47.83 56.25 8.70 9.38
AP4 0.00 0.00 39.13 25.00 47.83 62.50 13.04 12.50
AP5 0.00 0.00 69.57 43.75 30.43 46.88 0.00 9.38
AP6 8.70 9.38 56.52 53.13 30.43 34.38 4.35 3.13
AP7 8.70 0.00 52.17 25.00 34.78 62.50 4.35 12.50
AP8 26.09 9.38 69.57 50.00 4.35 31.25 0.00 9.38
AP9 30.43 6.25 52.17 68.75 13.04 25.00 4.35 0.00
AP10 8.70 18.75 69.57 40.63 21.74 28.13 0.00 12.50
AP11 0.00 0.00 52.17 75.00 47.83 25.00 0.00 0.00
AP12 4.35 3.13 82.61 81.25 8.70 15.63 4.35 0.00
AP13 17.39 6.25 52.17 46.88 26.09 40.63 4.35 6.25
Table 9 Sign test for median – Time budget
Sign Test of median = 0.00000 versus > 0.00000
N N* Below Equal Above p median
Assistant hours 54 1 8 20 26 0.0015 0.0000
Senior hours 54 1 8 12 34 0.0000 5.0000
Manager hours 54 1 6 22 26 0.0003 0.0000
Partner hours 54 1 3 16 35 0.0000 2.0000
Total hours 54 1 5 5 44 0.0000 14.5000
Table 10 Time budget modification responses to the assessed fraud risk
Variables
Mann-Whitney U Test (w/ continuity correction) 















Assistant Hours 951.0 589.0 313.0 0.9299 0.352404 0.964163 0.334965 32 23 0.355370
Senior Hours 973.0 567.0 291.0 1.3053 0.191783 1.339110 0.180536 32 23 0.193459
Manager Hours 1065.5 474.5 198.5 2.8837 0.003931 2.990834 0.002782 32 23 0.003273
Partner Hours 983.0 557.0 281.0 1.4759 0.139956 1.509977 0.131050 32 23 0.140908
Total Hours 1037.0 503.0 227.0 2.3974 0.016514 2.408555 0.016016 32 23 0.015633
